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Abstract 
Western commentators have many misperceptions on China's approach to international investment 
law. They divided China's bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") into two generations —
conservative and liberal; but this article argues that China has three generations of BITs: the first 
generation is conservative, the second is liberal, and the third has reached a more balanced 
approach. They criticized China for not including pre-establishment national treatment in its BITs, 
not allowing most-favored-nation clause to extend to procedural issues and not accepting the "Hull 
Formula" in calculating compensation amount for expropriation. These criticisms are untenable, 
as what they proposed is not well-established and widely-accepted practice in the international 
community. They also criticized China for not actively participating in investor-State dispute 
settlement, as they failed to notice China's increasing participation in recent years and China's 
political considerations, especially when it is related to the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. 
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Introduction 
International investment law is primarily shaped by a variety of treaties, and bilateral 
investment treaties ("BITs") are the most important source of contemporary international 
investment law.1 As a result, if one wants to study a particular State's approach to international 
investment law, it would be wise to start with that State's BITs.2  
It is relatively easy to understand the Western approach to international investment law, 
which tends to provide foreign investors a wide range of protections including "an expansive 
definition of 'investment' and 'investor'; national treatment; most favored nation treatment; a 
minimum standard of treatment (including fair and equitable treatment); restrictions on 
performance requirements; free transfer and convertibility of profits and proceeds from sales of 
assets; flexibility with regard to nationality of management; and protection against both direct 
and indirect expropriation, among others", as well as "a process, including detailed procedural 
requirements, for mandatory resolution of investor-[S]tate disputes through third-party 
international arbitration".3  
China's approach to international investment law, on the contrary, is quite complicated. 
Commentators have recognized a transformation of China's approach – from a very conservative 
one that "includes several regulations limiting the substantive and procedural protection of 
foreign investments and thereby preserves the sovereign right of host [S]tates to maintain 
national laws and regulations on the entry and operation of foreign investors in accordance with 
national development strategies" to a Westernized one that includes almost all standard 
provisions found in mainstream BITs.4  
                                                             
1     See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
13, 28 (2d ed. 2012). 
2     Technically, the investment chapters in Free Trade Agreements ("FTAs") are not BITs. However, for 
convenience, when we refer to BITs below, the investment chapters in FTAs are also included, unless 
otherwise indicated.  
3     David A. Gantz, Challenges for the United States in Negotiating a BIT with China: Reconciling 
Reciprocal Investment Protection with Policy Concerns, 31 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 203, 211 (2014) 
(citations omitted).  
4     See Axel Berger, The Politics of China’s Investment Treaty-Making Program (Oct. 31, 2010), at 4, 9-
20, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1838651 [hereinafter Berger, 
Politics]; Congyan Cai, China-US BIT Negotiations and the Future of Investment Treaty Regime: A Grand 
Bilateral Bargain with Multilateral Implications, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 457, 459 (2009) (referring to this 
6 
 
Despite the dramatic change, many Western lawyers still hold certain stereotype and bias 
against China and severely criticize China's approach to international investment law. Many of 
these criticisms, in the author's view, are either due to the Western lawyers' misperception on 
China's approach, or because they have failed to understand the reasons behind China's approach. 
Therefore, this article aims to identify those Western stereotypes, biases, misperceptions and 
criticisms; clarify China's real approach to international investment law; defend some of China's 
practices which, in the author's view, should not be criticized; praise those underappreciated by 
the Western commentators; and explore the historical, legal and economic reasons behind China's 
approach.  
This article is divided into six parts, including the introduction and a brief conclusion in 
Parts I and VI, respectively. Part II reviews the relatively common approach to describing China's 
two generations of BITs, and it explains how this narrative provides an incomplete picture of 
China's approach to international investment law. Part III explores the substantive protections 
that Chinese BITs provide to foreign investors, including most-favored-nation ("MFN") treatment 
and national treatment. Part IV describes expropriation and compensation, with particular 
emphasis on how China's practice has evolved over time, putting that evolution in its historical 
context and in light of current practice. Part V focuses on evidence in the BITs and State practice 
that suggest China's changing attitude towards investor-State dispute settlement ("ISDS"), with a 
particular interest in how China will handle investment disputes related to the Belt and Road 
Initiative.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
transition as China’s bilateral investment treaties having been "Americanized") [hereinafter Cai, China-US 
BIT]. 
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I.  Generations of Chinese Bilateral Investment Treaties  
In 1982, China entered into its first BIT (with Sweden), and so far it has signed 145 BITs, 
as well as 23 treaties with investment provisions.5 Around half —68 treaties—were entered into 
in the 1990s, while others were signed in the 1980s (24 treaties) and the 21st century.6 Notably, 
32 BITs have been upgraded in the 21st century, either by concluding a new treaty or by issuing 
an amendment protocol or joint interpretation.7  
Comparing the texts of China's first BIT—the 1982 China-Sweden BIT and one of the 
most recent—the 2012 China-Canada BIT, one would be amazed at the dramatic changes 
occurred in China's BIT practice. One might ask: how exactly have China's BITs changed and 
when did the changes occur? 
Many Western lawyers believe that China's approach to BIT changed only once, when 
China liberalized its BIT practice around the turn of the century, and they claimed that the 2001 
China-Netherlands BIT "heralded a new era of China's BIT practice".8As a result, they have 
found two generations of Chinese BITs —the old restrictive generation and the new liberal one.9 
The question arises how one can tell the new generation from the old one. Schill, one of those 
who believe in the "two generations" theory, has summarized two major innovations in the new 
generation —the inclusion of national treatment and the acceptance of comprehensive ISDS.10 
                                                             
5     International Investment Agreements Navigator—China, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV.: 
INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryOtherIias/42#iiaInnerMenu 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2018).  
6     See NORAH GALLAGHER & WENHUA SHAN, CHINESE INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICIES AND 
PRACTICE 31 (2009). 
7     See Jie Huang, Procedural Models to Upgrade BITs: China’s Experience, 31 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 93, 94 
(2018). 
8     See, e.g., Lin Jacobsen, International Investment Law with Chinese Characteristics: Zooming in on 
China’s BIT Practice, 26 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 19, 21 (2015). 
9     See Stephan W. Schill, Tearing Down the Great Wall: The New Generation Investment Treaties of 
The People's Republic of China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 73, 77 (2007); Aaron M. Chandler, 
BITs, MFN Treatment and the PRC: The Impact of China's Ever-Evolving Bilateral Investment Treaty 
Practice, 43 THE INT’L. LAW. 1301, 1302 (2009); Gordon Smith, Chinese Bilateral Investment Treaties: 
Restrictions on International Arbitration, 76 ARB. 58, 58-59 (2010); Monika C. E. Heymann, 
International Law and the Settlement of Investment Disputes Relating to China, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507, 
524 (2008); Berger, Politics, supra note 5, at 10. 
10     See Schill, supra note 10, at 77. 
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In the author's view, however, the "two generations" theory seems to have oversimplified 
the changing landscape of China's BITs. More accurately, China's approach has shifted twice, 
with the first change happening in 1998, and the second one happening between 2005 and 2007; 
and while the first shift could be described as "liberalization", the effects of the second one was 
liberalizing some aspects but de-liberalizing others to reach a more balanced approach.11 As a 
result, China's BIT practice has undergone three, rather than two, phases.12  
A.  First Generation: Conservative 
Chinese BITs before 1998 were notoriously conservative.13 BITs signed in this phase did 
not provide investors with any type of national treatment, or stipulated that national treatment 
should be "subject to its law"; moreover, some BITs failed to provide any ISDS mechanism at all, 
and while others provided some types of ISDS, only disputes over compensation amount arising 
from expropriation could be submitted to international arbitration without case-by-case consent 
from the host State.14  
Some Western lawyers are too ready to criticize this conservative approach, because they 
failed to see the historical, cultural, legal and economic reasons behind it.15 As argued by Cai, 
four reasons can justify the approach, or at least explain why China was perfectly legitimate to 
adopt such a conservative approach at that time.16 Firstly, under the economic system in 
transformation from planned economy to market economy, Chinese companies, mostly state-
owned-enterprises ("SOEs"), had to undertake more social and economic obligations than those 
foreign investors did, which arguably made national treatment legally inequitable.17 Secondly, 
                                                             
11     See Cai, China-US BIT, supra note 5, at 461-62; Axel Berger, Investment Rules in Chinese 
Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements: Is China Following the Global Trend Towards 
Comprehensive Agreements? 6-12 (2013) (discussion paper) (on file with the German Development 
Institute) [hereinafter Berger, Rules].  
12     See Cai, China-US BIT, supra note 5, at 461-62. 
13     See id. at 461. See also Congyan Cai, Outward Foreign Direct Investment Protection and the 
Effectiveness of Chinese BIT Practice, 7 J. WORLD. INVEST. & TRADE 621, 641-48 (2006) [hereinafter 
Cai, Outward FDI] (providing more information on this issue). 
14     See Cai, China-US BIT, supra note 5, at 461; Cai, Outward FDI, supra note 14, at 638, 641. 
15     See, e.g., Schill, supra note 10, at 89-91, 94-97. 
16     See Cai, China-US BIT, supra note 5, at 461. 
17     See id. 
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Chinese companies at that time lacked competitiveness as compared to their foreign counterparts, 
which rendered national treatment economically unfeasible.18 Thirdly, from a cultural 
perspective, China's notion of absolute sovereignty discouraged it from adopting Western style 
international law, with international arbitration being one of the most notable aspects of 
international law that it had difficulty with, thereby rendering China reluctant to give the type of 
ISDS to foreign investors that they desired.19 Finally, at that time, China's outward direct 
investment ("ODI") is negligible as compared to the large amount of foreign direct investment 
("FDI") it received, so China had little incentive to enter into BITs that would protect its own 
investments and investors overseas.20 
B.  Second Generation: Liberal 
From 1998 to the mid-2000s, Chinese BITs became significantly more liberal.21 For 
example, many provide for post-establishment national treatment without the traditional 
limitations such as "subject to its law".22 In addition, all disputes arising from investment (not 
limited to compensation amount disputes anymore) can be submitted to international arbitral 
tribunals without the host State’s case-by-case consent.23  
What is the reason behind this dramatic change? Some Western commentators argue that 
"pro-investor and pro-rule of law developments in China's BITs have occurred as a result of other 
countries' policies—particularly OECD countries and developing democracies" and "developed 
democracies have been successful in promoting stronger property rights [for] foreign investors 
[in China]".24 This argument, in the author's view, demonstrates a lack of common sense of 
China's fundamental policies and thus is unconvincing. The Chinese communist regime has 
always been ideologically hostile towards "developed democracies". It insists on legal and 
                                                             
18     See id. 
19     See id. 
20     See id. 
21     See id. See also Cai, Outward FDI, supra note 14, at 641-48. 
22     See Cai, China-US BIT, supra note 5, at 461-62. 
23     See id.  
24     Kate Hadley, Do China’s BITs Matter? Assessing the Effect of China’s Investment Agreements on 
Foreign Direct Investment Flows, Investors’ Rights, and the Rule of Law, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 255, 310 
(2013). 
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economic systems with "Chinese characteristics" and adamantly resists the influence of Western 
countries' policies. As a result, the only reason that could make China change its approach would 
be huge economic incentives. Promotion of ideologies like "rule of law" and "property rights" by 
"developed democracies" could not possibly be a factor that China would take into consideration.   
In fact, China's liberalization of BITs was a result of its new economic policy encouraging 
Chinese companies to invest overseas, known as "going abroad" ("zou chu qu" in Chinese), as a 
result of the growth of China's economy.25 More fundamentally, as Gallagher and Shan explain, 
the surge of China's ODI was due to the economic success brought about by its WTO entry, 
particularly with the significant trade surplus and the explosion of FDI inflow, which in turn 
resulted in an enormous foreign exchange reserve.26 Hence, the main concern of China, from then 
on, was no longer how to attract FDI and build up a large foreign exchange reserve, but how to 
make good use of the existing reserve and make ODI.27 China continues to be attractive to FDI, 
but at the same time, its ODI has been increasing sharply each year since the new "going abroad" 
policy was adopted in 1998, with ODI levels climbing to US$68.8 billion in 2010, making China 
as the fifth biggest investment source.28 In this new context, Chinese investors have become 
particularly sensitive to political risks and investment barriers that might negatively affect their 
investments overseas.29  
As an emerging large capital-exporting country, China shifted its BIT practice from the 
conservative to liberal, with the aim to protect its own investments and investors overseas. 
Notably, the first BIT which reflects China’s liberal approach was its treaty with Barbados in 
                                                             
25     See Cai, China-US BIT, supra note 5, at 462. 
26     See GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 7, at 12. 
27     See id, at 14. 
28     See 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, MINISTRY OF COMM. 
CHINA: STATISTICS (2010), at 4-5, 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/statistic/foreigninvestment/201109/20110907742320.shtml; 
World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development, 
UNCTAD, (2011), at 9, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2011_en.pdf. 
29     See 2009 World Investment and Political Risks, MULTILATERAL INVEST. GUAR. AGENCY (2010), at 
84, 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2688/520190PUB0flag10Box345548B01P
UBLIC1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
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1998 (earlier than the 2001 China-Netherlands BIT, which, as argued by many Western 
commentators, "heralded a new era of China’s BIT practice"30), which for the first time agreed 
that any investment dispute could be submitted to international arbitration without specific 
consent of the host State.31  
C.  A New Balanced Generation  
Some Western commentators failed to notice that China's approach changed again in mid-
2010s. This time, what China did was not comprehensively liberalizing its BIT practice, but 
rather liberalizing some aspects while de-liberalizing others.  
On the one hand, China started to include references to the "minimum standard of 
treatment", which shows China's willingness to accept customary international law in the area of 
international investment law.32 The significance of this shift should not be underappreciated, as 
China once viewed customary international law as a Western notion disregarding developing 
countries' interests.33 Another example of liberalization would be the inclusion of the term 
"admission" or "establishment" in the list of investment activities covered by the MFN clause.34  
On the other hand, bearing in mind the experience that States like the U.S. and Argentina 
have been dragged into a huge amount of investment arbitrations, China tried to strike a balance 
between the interests of foreign investors and host States in its third-generation BITs.35 For 
                                                             
30     See, e.g., Jacobsen, supra note 9, at 21. 
31     See Agreement between the Government of Barbados and the Government of the People's Republic 
of China for the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 9, Barb.-China, July 20, 1998. (All 
investment treaties, including investment chapters in free trade agreements, cited throughout this article 
are available in UNCTAD's online database of international investment instruments, located at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA.) 
32     See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United Mexican States and the Government of 
the People's Republic of China on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 5, China-
Mex., Nov. 7, 2008 [hereinafter China-Mexico BIT (2008)]; Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investment Between the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the Government of 
the People's Republic of China art. 2, China-Colom., Nov. 22, 2008 [hereinafter China-Colombia BIT 
(2008)]; Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the People's Republic of 
China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 4, Can.-China, Sept. 9, 2012 
[hereinafter China-Canada BIT (2012)]. 
33     See Berger, Rules, supra note 12, at 10; Cai, China-US BIT, supra note 5, at 468. 
34     See Berger, Rules, supra note 12, at 11. 
35     See id. at 10; Cai, China-US BIT, supra note 5, at 462. 
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instance, while all types of investment disputes can be arbitrated, the new generation of China's 
BITs would include preliminary procedures to discourage foreign investors from abusing their 
rights.36 This balanced approach can also be illustrated by China's adoption of the term "in like 
circumstances" in clauses such as MFN treatment,37 national treatment38 and compensation for 
losses,39 aiming at reducing the room for interpretation by international arbitral tribunals.40 
Another example would be exceptions to the free transfer of investment-related funds, which 
allow host States to restrict investment flows in the event of serious balance-of-payments or other 
macroeconomic difficulties.41  
Notably, although this article argues that China has three generations of BITs, the 
fundamental problem with many Western commentators is not that they argue two generations 
instead of three. The number "three" or "two" itself does not make any sense unless one explains 
clearly how to divide those generations and specifies the characteristics of each generation. Even 
those commentators who superficially divide China's BITs into three generations (i.e., the 1980s , 
the 1990s and the 2000s) are still wrong,42 because they have oversimplified China's BIT practice 
during the past thirty years as a "one-directional liberalization" process43 and failed to notice that 
                                                             
36     See Cai, China-US BIT, supra note 5, at 462.  
37     See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the 
Government of The Republic of Korea on the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 3, China-S. 
Kor., Sept. 7, 2007 [hereinafter China-Korea BIT (2007)]; China-Mexico BIT (2008), supra note 33, arts. 
3-4; China-Canada BIT (2012), supra note 33, arts. 5-6. 
38     See, e.g., China-Korea BIT (2007), supra note 38, art. 3; China-Mexico BIT (2008), supra note 33, 
art. 3; China-Colombia BIT (2008), supra note 33, art. 3; Free Trade Agreement Between the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Peru art. 129, China-Peru, Apr. 
28, 2009; Agreement on Investment of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Between the People’s Republic of China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations art. 
4, China-ASEAN, Aug. 15, 2009 [hereinafter China-ASEAN BIT (2009)]; Agreement Among the 
Government of Japan, the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China for the Promotion, Facilitation and Protection of Investment art. 3, May 13, 2012; 
China-Canada BIT (2012), supra note 33, art. 6. 
39     See, e.g., China-ASEAN BIT (2009), supra note 39, art. 9; China-Canada BIT (2012), supra note 33, 
art. 11. 
40     See Berger, Rules, supra note 12, at 10-11. 
41     See id. at 11. 
42     See Won Kidane, China-Africa Bilateral Investment Treaties in Comparative Context, 49 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 141, 142-53 (2016). 
43     See Jacobsen, supra note 9, at 21. 
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in mid-2010s China began to step backwards and pursue a more balanced approach. 
III.  Investment Treatment 
Treatment of foreign investment is no doubt the central issue of international investment 
law. Although most second- and third-generation Chinese BITs contain treatment that a typical 
European or American BIT has, criticisms and misperceptions have not yet disappeared in the 
minds of Western commentators, especially when it comes to national treatment and MFN 
treatment.  
A.  National Treatment 
    In theory, national treatment includes pre-establishment national treatment, which 
guarantees foreign investors' market access, and post-establishment national treatment, which 
protects the existing investments' operations.44 In practice, however, not every BIT contains both.   
1.  Pre-establishment National Treatment  
The U.S. is the most typical State that insists on pre-establishment national treatment. 
Although post-establishment national treatment used to be all that the U.S. required,45 since the 
mid-1980s pre-establishment national treatment has been included in almost all its investment 
treaties.46 For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), as well as the 
U.S. Model BITs of 1994 and 2004, require contracting parties to provided national treatment to 
"the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other 
disposition of investments".47  
                                                             
44     See Cai, China-US BIT, supra note 5, at 469. 
45     See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Morocco Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. II(2), U.S.-Morocco, July 22, 1985 
[hereinafter U.S.-Morocco BIT (1985)] ("2. Each Party shall accord to these investments, once 
established, and associated activities, treatment no less favorable than that accorded in like situations to 
investments of its own nationals and companies or to investments of nationals and companies of any third 
country, whichever is most favorable").  
46     See Cai, China-US BIT, supra note 5, at 469. 
47     North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1102(1), Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 
(1993) (emphasis added); Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of _______Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (1994 
Model BIT) art. 2(1), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2867; Treaty Between 
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of [Country] Concerning the 
14 
 
Western commentators have been quick to criticize China's approach to national 
treatment. Bath has criticized China for refusing to grant pre-establishment national treatment to 
foreign investors, and has categorized China's approach as the "investment control model".48 
Schill, who generally appreciates China's liberalization of BIT practice, nevertheless has 
criticized China's rejection of pre-establishment national treatment.49 From his perspective, 
China's BITs made itself "unrestricted in subjecting foreign investors to pre-establishment 
approval or excluding them from specific sectors of the economy".50 This article sees such 
criticism as untenable for the following four reasons.  
First, even the U.S. does not grant an absolute pre-establishment national treatment; 
instead, it limits national treatment to particular economic sectors and activities.51 For instance, 
the 2012 U.S. Model BIT excludes sectors such as financial services.52 In addition, a few U.S. 
BITs say that national treatment depends on the host State's legislation.53 According to the 
classification provided by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, what the U.S. 
adopts is the "pre-establishment with a negative list approach" ("negative list" refers to reserved 
activities or excepted industries that national treatment does not apply).54 This is what Bath and 
Schill fail to mention when they criticize China for its so-called "investment control model" and 
                                                             
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (2004 Model BIT) art. 3, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2872. 
48     See Vivienne Bath, The Quandary of Chinese Regulators: Controlling the Flow of Investment Into 
and Out of China, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW AND PRACTICE IN ASIA 68, 
76-77 (Vivienne Bath & Luke Nottage eds., 2011). 
49     See Schill, supra note 10, at 86. 
50     Id. 
51     See Qianwen Zhang, Opening Pre-Establishment National Treatment in International Investment 
Agreements: An Emerging “New Normal” in China?, 11 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
437, 441 (2016). 
52     Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of [Country] 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (2012 U.S. Model BIT) art. 20, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2870. 
53     See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Panama Concerning the 
Treatment and Protection of Investment art. 2(1), Pan-U.S., Oct. 27, 1982. 
54     See Admission and Establishment: UNCTAD Series on issues in international investment agreements, 
UNCTAD (2002), at 3-4, http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiit10v2_en.pdf. 
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its denial of pre-establishment national treatment.55 
Secondly, only treaties can require the provision of national treatment, not customary 
international law.56 Looking at the relevant treaty practice of various States, one will find that 
acceptance of the pre-establishment model is actually very limited throughout the world. Cai 
correctly points out that "it is doubtful that pre-establishment [national treatment] has become an 
established practice among developed countries".57 In fact, very few countries (such as the 
NAFTA members and Japan) adopt the pre-establishment model, while the vast majority of 
countries, including not only developing countries but also developed European countries, refuse 
to grant pre-establishment national treatment to foreign investors.58 Bath and Schill seem to have 
adopted a double standard as they criticize China but do not criticize European countries for 
denying pre-establishment national treatment. Indeed, pre-establishment national treatment 
cannot even to be called a Western approach. Instead, it is more of a unique U.S. approach with a 
few friends of the U.S. adopting it.  
Thirdly, there are indications that China may be willing to accept pre-establishment 
national treatment in its future BITs. In July 2013, during the fifth round of the China-U.S. 
Strategic and Economic Dialogue, China announced its intention to negotiate a BIT with the U.S. 
that "will cover all phases of investment, including market access, and sectors of the Chinese 
economy (except for any limited and transparent negotiated exceptions)".59 This is essentially the 
"pre-establishment with a negative list approach" which the U.S. adopts. Admittedly, the China-
U.S. BIT has not been concluded yet, and given the Trump administration's hostility towards 
China and globalization, the prospect of the treaty is bleak. Nevertheless, as far as China's part is 
concerned, it has indicated its willingness to embrace the pre-establishment model. 
Finally, a draft of China's Foreign Investment Law (“Draft FIL”) was circulated by the 
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Ministry of Commerce in January 2015.60 For decades, China's foreign investment legal regime 
was dominated by "Three Foreign Investment Laws"—the Law on Sino-foreign Equity Joint 
Ventures, the Law on Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprises and the Law on Sino-foreign 
Cooperative Joint Ventures — under which every single foreign investment transaction and the 
related agreements shall be approved by the government before the foreign-invested enterprises 
can be established. 61 But the Draft FIL, according to the Ministry of Commerce's official 
commentaries, "has abolished the case-by-case examination and approval system established by 
the Three Foreign Investment Laws and designed the foreign investment access administration 
system in line with the management mode of [pre-establishment] national treatment plus negative 
list".62 Under the Draft FIL, the government will publish a Catalogue of Special Administrative 
Measures (i.e., the “negative list”), which consists of two categories —prohibited industries and 
restricted industries.63 Article 25 of the Draft FIL stipulates that “[f]oreign investors shall not 
invest in any sector set out in the Catalogue of Prohibitions”, and Article 26 provides that “[a]n 
application for access permission is not required if the foreign investment is not involved in any 
circumstance set out in the Catalogue of Restrictions”.64 As a result, a majority of foreign 
investment access matters (those outside the "negative list") will no longer be subject to 
examination and approval.65 Sun, the spokesman for the Ministry of Commerce, made the 
following comments on the Draft FIL: 
Where the management mode of national treatment plus negative list prior to 
admission is adopted, the fields to which the foreign investment is prohibited or 
restricted will be included in a list; and the fields [other] than those included in that list 
                                                             
60     See Foreign Investment Law of the People's Republic of China (Draft for Comment), MINISTRY OF 
COMM. OF CHINA (2015), http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/english/201510/2015102311241865.doc. 
61     See Notes to the Foreign Investment Law of the People's Republic of China (Draft for Comment), 
MINISTRY OF COMM. OF CHINA (Jan. 19, 2015), 
http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/english/201510/20151023112521891.docx. 
62     Id. 
63     See Foreign Investment Law of the People's Republic of China (Draft for Comment), supra note 61, 
arts. 22-26. 
64     See id. arts. 25-26. 
65     See Notes to the Foreign Investment Law of the People's Republic of China (Draft for Comment), 
supra note 62. 
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will be fully open to investment, and these foreign investors or investment will receive 
treatment that is [not inferior to that] for Chinese investors or investment.66 
Albeit a draft, it indicates that China will adopt pre-establishment national treatment in its 
domestic law in the foreseeable future. More importantly, such a domestic legislation may be 
regarded as China's preparation for the future China-U.S. BIT and potentially more Chinese BITs 
which would adopt the pre-establishment model. Furthermore, quite a few "Pilot Free Trade 
Zones" have been established in China's coastal regions such as Shanghai, Guangdong, Tianjin 
and Fujian, and they have started to experiment on the pre-establishment national treatment.67  
2.  Post-establishment National Treatment 
Both Western and Chinese commentators agree that China has been willing to incorporate 
post-establishment national treatment into its BITs since 1998, i.e., its second- and third-
generation BITs. Nevertheless, Western commentators still seem to have some concerns. 
After examining the so-called "grandfather clause" in the protocol to the 2003 China-
Germany BIT, which provides that national treatment does not apply to "any existing non-
conforming measures maintained within its territory" and "the continuation of any such non-
conforming measure", Heymann concludes:  
The national treatment clause in the new Chinese BITs is thus not yet perfect and 
China remains extremely cautious as to what extent it will treat foreign investors as 
national investors. It seems that China has still not overcome its initial concerns about 
the national treatment clause, which were that national industries have to be protected 
from competition and that China is determined to maintain [SOEs'] monopolies.68 
Moreover, Bath looks at Chinese domestic law on foreign investment and expresses her 
view that despite China's liberalized practice of BITs at the international level, Chinese domestic 
laws, regulations and policies on FDI have not changed substantially.69 She criticizes China for 
                                                             
66     Jiwen Sun, Comments on Foreign Investment Law (Exposure Draft) Issued for Soliciting Public 
Opinions (Jan. 22, 2015), 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/policyreleasing/201501/20150100875221.shtml. 
67     See Zhang, supra note 52, at 452-53. 
68     Heymann, supra note 10, at 526. 
69     See Bath, supra note 49, at 69-73, 77-78. 
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keeping a different regime for foreign-invested enterprises under its domestic law and 
discriminating against foreign investors and in favor of Chinese companies, especially SOEs.70 
This article argues that these criticisms are untenable. Indeed, the "grandfather clause" 
exists in some Chinese BITs. However, it is almost always accompanied by (1) the "standstill 
clause", which prohibits the creation of new discriminations against foreign investors or 
privileges for Chinese companies, and (2) the "rollback clause", which demonstrates China’s 
willingness to continuously abandon non-conforming measures.71 These two clauses, in effect, 
make sure that China will not implement new non-conforming measures and will gradually get 
rid of existing ones.  
Moreover, few Western commentators are aware that in the Chinese legal system, 
international treaty provisions prevail over domestic law in case of conflict.72 Thus, although in a 
different context, Wang points out that BITs have the effect of filling the gap in Chinese law and 
prevailing over any conflicting provisions of Chinese law.73 In a highly globalized world, the line 
between domestic and international legal realms has become blurred over time, and international 
norms are, by way of treaties like BITs, seeping more and more into the domestic legal systems 
of sovereign States.74 From Wang's perspective, filling gaps and prevailing conflicting domestic 
laws are precisely the use of BITs in the development of the Chinese legal system on protection 
of foreign investment, and thus BITs can serve as a tool to move international norms into the 
                                                             
70     See id.  
71     See Schill, supra note 10, at 98. 
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Chinese domestic law.75  
Of course, this does not mean that China need not amend its domestic law. On the 
contrary, to play a role in the international community commensurate to its size and economic 
importance, particularly in the realm of investment, China still has much to do; specifically, it 
needs to review and modify its domestic laws, regulations and policies to cope with the ever-
changing situation.76 This is exactly what China appears to be doing. As mentioned above, 
China's Ministry of Commerce published the Draft FIL in January 2015. The Draft FIL has not 
only touched on the issue of pre-establishment national treatment, but it has improved post-
establishment national treatment as well.  
Under the old foreign investment legal regime, the Three Foreign Investment Laws have 
formed an "independent kingdom" outside of those general business organization laws, such as 
the Company Law and the Partnership Law. Practitioners sometimes complain that it is difficult 
to resolve conflicts between the Three Foreign Investment Laws and the Company Law.77 
Although the Company Law as amended in 2013 stipulates in principle that the Company Law 
shall apply to all foreign-invested limited liability companies and joint stock companies, an 
exception was also made: where foreign investment laws have conflicting provisions, such 
provisions shall prevail.78 But the Draft FIL will abolish the split and bring harmonization to the 
Chinese corporate law regime. According to Sun's Comments, the Draft FIL: 
no longer takes the organization forms or operating activities of foreign-invested 
enterprises as main items to be regulated. As for the organization forms and operating 
activities of foreign-invested enterprises, on basis of uniform principles for domestic and 
foreign investment, relevant laws and regulations, such as Company Law, will apply in a 
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uniform manner.79 
Therefore, this draft indicates China's willingness to review and amend its domestic law 
to grant foreign investors genuine national treatment. Most recently, the Ministry of Commerce 
announced on November 2, 2017 that the new Foreign Investment Law is progressing well, as the 
draft has been submitted for further discussion by the central government, and that "the ministry 
will collaborate with the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council to speed up the 
lawmaking pace in the next stage".80 
In addition, post-establishment national treatment is not a serious problem for foreign 
investors in reality, because China has tended to give foreign investors more favorable treatment 
than that given its own nationals.81 For example, according to the Circular of the State Council on 
Adjustment of Imported Equipment Taxation Policies, the State Council determined that 
"imported equipment of domestic investment projects and foreign investment projects 
encouraged by the state enjoy exemption from tariff and import stage value-added tax" within a 
specified scope, starting from January 1, 1998.82 The actual "more favorable treatment" given to 
foreign investors is recognized by not only legal commentators but also economists as well. For 
example, Huang, a Chinese economist, after extensive empirical study, concludes that there is 
"legislative and regulatory superiority" enjoyed by foreign investors in China's economy, and this 
"superiority" has created a business environment that is more "friendly" to foreign-invested 
enterprises than to domestic private firms.83 China's SOEs, as opposed to private firms, are 
indeed a problem. However, some high profile Chinese officials, including Premier Li, have 
indicated China's willingness and resolution to reform its SOEs.84 The effects of the proposed 
                                                             
79     Sun, supra note 67.  
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reform remain to be seen.  
B.  Most-Favored-Nation Treatment 
The MFN clause has formed part of international economic treaties for centuries.85 In 
recent years, this clause, along with clauses relating to other types of treatment such as fair-and-
equitable treatment and national treatment, has been included in nearly all Chinese BITs.86 
Notably, even in the first-generation BITs, MFN treatment was a common provision.87 
A remarkable step made by China concerning MFN treatment is that China has started 
applying pre-establishment MFN treatment. An example includes Article 3(3) of the 2004 China-
Finland BIT, which provides that "[w]ith respect to the establishment, acquisition, operation, 
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, expansion, sale or other disposal of investments", 
MFN treatment applies.88 Article 5(1) of the 2009 China-ASEAN BIT is even more explicit, 
extending MFN treatment to the "admission, establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, 
conduct, operation, maintenance, use, liquidation, sale, and other forms of disposal of 
investments".89 
Notably, the MFN clause in Chinese BITs can cover even more than what is covered by 
NAFTA. In practice, foreign investors in China receive both national treatment and MFN 
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strengthening supervision of the assets of the state enterprises."); Kwong Man-ki, China Expected to Push 
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85     See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 2, at 206. 
86     See GUIGUO WANG, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE 376 (2015) 
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87     See Qingjiang Kong, Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Chinese Approach and Practice, 8 ASIAN 
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treatment without exception.90 This is in contrast with (and more liberal than) NAFTA, inasmuch 
as Article 1410(1) of NAFTA provides that "[n]othing in this Part shall be construed to prevent a 
Party from adopting or maintaining reasonable measures for prudential reasons", even if the 
effect of such measures (as contrasted with their motive or intent) is discriminatory.91  
Nonetheless, MFN treatment should not be allowed to go too far, such as applying to 
procedural matters. For years, controversies have not been settled on whether MFN treatment is 
limited to substantive rights, or can also cover procedural ones.92 This question has been 
addressed in a number of cases, but the arbitral tribunals of those cases have reached diverging 
conclusions.93 In some cases, such as Maffezini, tribunals have answered in the affirmative,94 
while others have answered in the negative, such as the Salini arbitration.95  
Some Western commentators, such as Chandler, believe that interpretation of the MFN 
clauses in Chinese BITs should follow the Maffezini approach so that procedural rights are 
covered.96 However, China has never intended to let MFN treatment go that far. Leading Chinese 
international economic law professors, such as Chen and Cai, have suggested that dispute 
settlement procedures should be excluded from the coverage of MFN clause.97 This point is not 
purely academic, as it appears to have been adopted by the Chinese government. For example, 
the 2008 China-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement indicates that “for greater certainty, the 
obligation in this Article [139] does not encompass a requirement to extend to investors of the 
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other party dispute resolution procedures other than those set out in this chapter [Chapter 11].”98 
Another example would be Article 10(8)(6) of the 2008 modification agreement of the China-
Cuba BIT, in which the MFN clause was excluded from enforcement or annulment.99  
IV. Expropriation and Compensation 
A.  Historical Events 
China has had a disgraceful history of large-scale seizure and nationalization of foreign 
properties and enterprises from the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 to 1957; 
and no compensation was given when the expropriation took place.100 This is well documented in 
the Western literature. It is probably less well known that compensation did come at a later stage, 
through formal or informal channels.101 Concerning the formal ways, since the 1970s, when 
China officially restored diplomatic relations with the Western States, it began to settle the 
historical disputes concerning expropriation.102 In 1979, for example, as part of the normalization 
process between the U.S. and China, the two States signed the Agreement Concerning the 
Settlement of Claims (the "Agreement"), which provided that China pay a lump-sum of $80.5 
million in exchange for the U.S. unblocking $80.5 million in Chinese assets.103  
Some Western commentators and government officials are of the view that the Chinese 
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compensation was substantially less than what was claimed by the foreign investors.104 
Specifically, Solomon, the Undersecretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs during the Carter 
administration, reported that the Chinese lump-sum payment entitled the average U.S. claimant to 
a mere 41 percent compensation for his property that was nationalized by China.105 For example, 
the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission determined that a Delaware corporation was 
entitled to recover $144 million including interest, but ultimately it received only about $20 
million.106 In general, the Agreement left many U.S. claimants dissatisfied.107 As a result, the 
U.S. claimants contend that they are entitled to full compensation for their nationalized property, 
and they even argue that the Agreement violates both international and domestic law.108 
This article is not trying to argue that those contentions are wrong. However, it must be 
mentioned that, in addition to the aforementioned formal ways in which foreign investors 
received compensation, there were also some informal ways. For instance, since 1954, the 
companies that were expropriated have been employed as consultants in the interest of promoting 
Sino-Western trade, and this was exactly what they had hoped for in the years of expropriation.109 
All indications have shown that they have profited handsomely from this employment.110 This is 
perhaps something that they did not mention while calculating their claims under the Agreement. 
B.  Current Practice 
Fearing too much that those historical events may happen again, Chew made the 
following argument in the 1990s:  
The threat of expropriation by the Chinese government is not merely theoretical. 
After the Communist regime took control of the government in 1949, it began a 
nationalization and expropriation process. While political circumstances are very 
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different today, the fact that some of the current Chinese leaders were part of the early 
party power structure suggests that these events may be of more than mere historical 
interest.111 
Even in the 2010s, the U.S. government agencies still worry about the risk of 
expropriation in China, as the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a 
congressional commission, stated that "[p]rotection against expropriation is an especially 
important guarantee in China, following the large-scale seizure and nationalization of foreign 
assets after the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949".112  
    This concern, however, seems illusional today, because developing countries around 
the globe compete fiercely with each other to attract FDI, and since the existing capital inflows 
are far from sufficient to satisfy the needs of most developing countries, large-scale direct 
expropriation is not a major threat to foreign investment nowadays.113 In 2010, Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency of the World Bank Group noted that only 6% of respondents in its 
survey of political risks reported losses due to expropriation.114  
As for China in particular, all its BITs contain protection against expropriation.115 As 
indirect expropriation appears to be more of a threat to foreign investment nowadays than direct 
expropriation,116 all recent Chinese BITs contain rules on indirect expropriation in the form of 
"other legal measures having similar effect",117 which is similar to the language of NAFTA 
Article 1100(1).  
As a result, expropriations (including direct and indirect ones) are lawful under Chinese 
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BITs only if they fulfill four conditions — public purpose, due process, non-discrimination and 
compensation.118 This is similar to the U.S. approach.119  
Many Western commentators argue that although both the U.S. and Chinese BITs require 
compensation for expropriation, China always insists on "reasonable compensation" and rejects 
"prompt, adequate and effective compensation" (the "Hull Formula"120), which many consider to 
be the dominant standard under international law.121 This argument is not entirely correct. The 
1986 China-U.K. BIT, for example, still adopts the "reasonable compensation" standard in 
general terms; but, immediately thereafter, the reasonable standard was further elaborated: 
"[s]uch compensation shall amount to the real value of the investment expropriated immediately 
before the expropriation or impending expropriation became public knowledge, shall include 
interest at the normal rate until the date of payment, shall be made without undue delay, be 
effectively realizable and be freely transferable".122 Indeed, the prevailing Chinese view on 
compensation for expropriation has always been "reasonable compensation", rather than the Hull 
Formula. However, the actual wording of some Chinese BITs, such as the 1986 China-U.K. BIT, 
seems to have adopted, more or less, the Hull Formula in effect, while reluctantly giving lip-
service to "reasonable compensation" in order to quiet potential internal criticism.123  
Admittedly, China has not yet fully embraced the Hull Formula. Nonetheless, many 
recent Chinese BITs have adopted "fair market value" as a methodology to calculate loss and 
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damage arising from expropriation,124 which is commonly employed in the U.S. BITs,125 so the 
difference between the Chinese and U.S. approaches concerning compensation is not as much as 
it appears.126 
V.  Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
China has a long history of jealously guarding its sovereignty against international courts 
and tribunals.127 While China is still extremely reluctant to submit to international courts and 
tribunals those disputes which affect its "core interests", such as sovereignty, security and 
territorial integrity128—China's non-participation of the South China Sea Arbitration being the 
best example,129 it has become willing to participate in international dispute settlement 
mechanism for trade and investment disputes. For example, China is obviously very active in 
trade dispute settlement, as so far it has been involved in 199 cases before the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body, either as complainant, respondent or third-party.130 When it comes to 
investment disputes, China's approach is not that straight forward and thus deserves careful study.  
A.  "Reservation" under Article 25(4) of the ICSID Convention? 
Has China made a "reservation" when it acceded to the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States ("ICSID Convention") in 
1993? Some Western commentators believe so and argue that China's acceptance of the 
jurisdiction of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") is 
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limited to investment disputes "over compensation resulting from expropriation and 
nationalization".131  
Indeed, China notified the ICSID on January 7, 1993 that "pursuant to Article 25(4) of the 
Convention, the Chinese Government would only consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the 
[ICSID] disputes over compensation resulting from expropriation and nationalization".132 
However, the legal nature of this notification is not a "reservation". 
First, China issued its notification under Article 25(4), which states "[a]ny Contracting 
State may, at the time of ratification, acceptance of approval of this Convention or at any time 
thereafter, notify the Centre of the class or classes of disputes which it would or would not 
consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre".133 The Convention, per se, is silent on the 
legal effect of such a notification. Nevertheless, examining Article 25 as a whole, an arbitral 
tribunal under the ICSID Convention will have personal jurisdiction over a State only when two 
conditions are met: (1) the State has ratified the ICSID Convention; and (2) the State has 
consented to jurisdiction under the ICSID Convention Article 25(1). In other words, States do not 
automatically accept the ICSID’s jurisdiction when they become parties to the ICSID 
Convention, and thus a reservation at the time of joining ICSID is unnecessary.134 
Secondly, the ICSID Convention Article 25(4) provides that "[s]uch notification shall not 
constitute the consent required by [Article 25] paragraph (1)".135 That is to say, even if a State 
notifies the ICSID that it accepts ICSID's jurisdiction for certain investment disputes under 
Article 25(4), such a notification would be without legal effects.136 Therefore, it is logical to infer 
that notification refusing to accept ICSID's jurisdiction in certain types of cases also lacks legal 
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effect.137  
Finally, the ICSID Convention’s travaux préparatoires also confirms this view. 
According to the drafters, the object and purpose of Article 25(4) is to clarify that the ratification 
of the ICSID Convention does not constitute any form of consent to accept the jurisdiction of the 
ICSID and should not create any expectations to investors.138  
Therefore, it can be concluded that China's notification under Article 25(4) is for 
information purposes only and has no direct legal consequences, and thus China is free at any 
moment to accept the jurisdiction of the ICSID for all investment disputes.139 And this is exactly 
what China has done in its second- and third- generations of BITs. 
B.  Liberalization of Investor-State Dispute Settlement Clauses 
As discussed above, first-generation BITs are very conservative, most of which provide 
that, without case-by-case consent from the host State, only disputes concerning compensation 
amount arising from expropriation can be arbitrated. China liberalized the ISDS clauses in its 
BITs in 1998, and second- and third-generation BITs enable all investment disputes to be sent to 
arbitration, although third-generation BITs have added some procedural pre-requisites that aim to 
discourage abuse of rights by foreign investors.  
One should not take the liberalization process for granted. Wang uses arbitral awards 
concerning the fair and equitable treatment clause as an example to illustrate that it is not an easy 
decision for China to allow all investment disputes to be submitted to international arbitration: 
Recent arbitral awards involving Argentina and other countries have certainly 
sent a strong signal that the [fair and equitable treatment] clause may have devastating 
impact on the legal system and laws of the host countries. China was of course not 
unaware of the potential consequence of the fair and equitable [treatment] clause. Yet it 
still decided to have the clause stated in its BITs which shows that China is determined 
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to be a responsible member of the international community and to let its laws and 
administrative decisions be subject to the scrutiny of international arbitration. For a 
country with the communist party at the helm of affairs, this is in itself an important 
contribution to international investment law.140 
Indeed, it appears that China needed a considerable amount of courage to make this 
decision. 
C.  Actual Participation in Investor-State Arbitration 
China has fully embraced the investor-State arbitration mechanism in its BITs, as it is not 
only a party to the ICSID Convention, but also one of the world's most enthusiastic signatories of 
BITs that grant binding mandatory jurisdiction to the ICSID.141 Despite that, many Western 
commentators in around 2000 adopted the view that China's actual participation in investor-State 
arbitration, including both scenarios —Chinese investors as claimants and Chinese government 
as defendant, was very inactive.142 This might have been true one or two decades ago, but not 
anymore. In recent years, more and more investor-State arbitrations are brought under Chinese 
BITs, including five cases with Chinese investors as the claimants and three cases with the 
Chinese government as the respondent.143 Most recently, the China International Economic and 
Trade Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”), the leading institution for international arbitration in 
China, published its International Investment Arbitration Rules.144 It is for the first time a 
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Chinese arbitral institution adopted a set of rules specifically designed for international 
investment disputes,145 and the CIETAC may in the future become a forum for the Chinese 
government to be sued by foreign investors and also for Chinese investors to sue foreign States. 
Therefore, in the foreseeable future, we can expect to see even more investor-State arbitrations 
involving Chinese investors or the Chinese government. 
Nevertheless, the decision to seek investor-State arbitration is not a purely legal matter for 
many Chinese companies. Taking political factors into account, one might see a different picture 
of Chinese government and companies' involvement in investor-State arbitration. Since, most of 
the time, the Chinese government wants to maintain its historically friendly ties with developing 
countries, it may direct its SOEs, which make more than 60 percent of Chinese overseas 
investment, to refrain from suing developing countries before international arbitral tribunals.146 
This is in line with practitioners' experience. The author interviewed an attorney working at an 
international law firm in New York, and he told the author that the firm's clients included some 
large Chinese SOEs making investments overseas; in several occasions, they encountered 
disputes with the host States, but when the attorneys advised them to sue the host States before 
international arbitral tribunals, they appeared to be very reluctant.147 They told the attorneys that 
that suing foreign corporations in international commercial arbitrations is one thing, and suing 
foreign governments in investor-State arbitrations is another thing, because they would need to 
seek the approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce before they 
could sue foreign governments; and they indicated that they did not think the two ministries 
would easily approve that.148  
Thus, while investments disputes between Chinese investors and host States will be 
increasing, there would probably not be as many investor-State arbitrations brought by Chinese 
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investors as some might expect.149 Moreover, China may prefer dispute settlement mechanisms 
other than investor-State arbitration, especially in context of the Belt and Road Initiative. 
D.  Belt and Road Initiative and Dispute Settlement Mechanisms other than Investor-
State Arbitration  
    The Belt and Road Initiative refers to the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road.150 First proposed by President Xi in 2013, it is a significant development 
strategy launched by the Chinese government with the aim to promote economic cooperation 
among countries along the proposed Belt and Road routes.151 According to the State Council's 
"Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initiative": 
The Silk Road Economic Belt focuses on bringing together China, Central Asia, 
Russia and Europe (the Baltic); linking China with the Persian Gulf and the 
Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and West Asia; and connecting China with 
Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road 
is designed to go from China's coast to Europe through the South China Sea and the 
Indian Ocean in one route, and from China's coast through the South China Sea to the 
South Pacific in the other.152 
Apparently, countries along the Belt and Road are mainly developing countries without a 
strong rule of law. Thus, it is not hard to imagine that when doing business in those countries, a 
considerable number of disputes would arise. Nevertheless, despite China's BITs with most of the 
Belt and Road countries which contain investor-State arbitration provisions, China, including 
Chinese government and companies, may resort to other mechanisms to settle investment 
disputes, such as mediation  
    The theme of the Belt and Road Initiative is economic cooperation, so China definitely 
considers the countries along the Belt and Road to be its partners and friends, rather than 
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competitors or hostile enemies. As discussed above, China generally wants to maintain a friendly 
relationship with most developing countries, even when disputes arise between its SOEs and the 
governments of developing countries. Thus, China is very likely to direct its SOEs to resolve 
investment disputes with the governments of the Belt and Road countries through mediation, 
which seems more "friendly" than mandatory arbitration, and it may be regarded as China’s good 
will to its partner countries.153 
    Various mediation institutions are ready to provide mediation service for Belt and Road 
related disputes. For example, the Singapore International Mediation Centre, for example, has 
already announced that it will collaborate with the Mediation Center of the China Council for the 
Promotion of International Trade / China Chamber of International Commerce to mediate 
disputes arising out of Belt and Road related transactions.154 The proposed Asia-Pacific Regional 
Mediation Organization is also considered a good option.155 
 
  
                                                             
153     See Chang-fa Lo et al., supra note 129, at 171. 
154     See Singapore and China Mediation Centres Work Together to Help Businesses Resolve Disputes 
along Belt and Road, MINISTRY OF LAW OF SINGAPORE (Sept. 19, 2017), 
https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/minlaw/en/news/press-releases/singapore-and-china-mediation-centres-
work-together-to-help-busi.html. 
155     Chang-fa Lo et al., supra note 129, at 171. 
34 
 
Conclusion 
Western commentators have many misperceptions on China's approach to international 
investment law. As is often the case, the reality of China's approach proves to be somewhat 
complicated, with evidence of evolution in recent years. At the early stages, China was hostile to 
foreign investment, as it expropriated foreign investments without providing compensation. From 
a broad perspective, China was hostile not only to foreign investment, but also to the Western 
world in general. Over time, when China started to improve its diplomatic relations with Western 
States, it adopted an "open-door" policy and provided some compensation to foreign investors 
whose investments were expropriated. Since then, China has continued to try to attract foreign 
investment, with BITs featuring prominently in that effort.  
Chinese BITs used to be conservative. In 1998, China significantly liberalized its BITs by 
adopting many of the protections that one would see in the BITs of Western States. Since then, 
China’s approach continued to evolve, becoming more liberal in some aspects while introducing 
some limitations in others. Today, China's BITs tend to strike a balance between the sovereignty 
of host States and the protection of foreign investors. To conclude, while China's approach to 
international investment law can be seen as largely Westernized or Americanized, it nevertheless 
retains its own unique characteristics. Western commentators need to realize this if they are to 
fully understand China's real approach to international investment law.   
